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P.: Workmen's Compensation--Mental and Emotional Attitude of Employee

CASE COMMENTS
est in oil and gas leases is a purchaser for value within the meaning
of the recording statutes. Carter Oil Co. v. McQuigg, 112 F.2d 275
(7th Cir. 1940). The courts are in accord that purchasers of real
property interests under oil and gas leases are entitled to rely on the
record title, and are not subject to the secret equities of third persons.
Angichiodo v. Cerami,28 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. La. 1939). Though
subsequent purchasers are clearly bound by the record title, it would
seem that they would not be bound by alterations in respect to the
property where the record title was not changed to conform with
such a modification.
With the above possible exception, a consideration of the recording statutes in their full context makes it manifest that there
would be great doubt that the modification agreement would be
covered thereunder. This result could be reached only if the West
Virginia court should regard the lessee's interest as a real property
interest. There is clearly some doubt that they would so hold. The
dissents deficient quotation of the recording statute leads not only to
an erroneous oversimplification of the law, but also to a most conf using analysis of the position of this case in regard to the recording
statutes. The conflict in factual statements in the two opinions renders a firm resolution of this case in the mind of the reader extremely difficult and speculative.
L. B. S.
WoRxni's COwmFESATiON-MENTAL An EmOTONAL ATrrTuE
OF EMPLOYEE CONSEwmu
FAcEroR iN BxcovERY.-Appeal from a

workmen's compensation award to D who suffered a heart attack
which, according to expert medical testimony, could have been
caused by the mental and emotional strain of her job, coupled with
her pre-existing hypertension. She later died. Held, that where an
employee's disability or illness is aggravated by mental and emotional strain on the job leading to resulting injury or death, the injury is
compensable even in the absence of direct physical activity as a factor contributing to the disability. Ins. Dep't of Mississippi v. Dinsmore, 102 So. 2d 691 (Miss. 1958).
The principal case represents a departure from the prevailing
line of authority in compensation cases for two reasons: it considers
the worker's mental and emotional attitude toward, and the emotional demands of his job, then allows recovery in the absence of direct physical activity as a factor in the injury.
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Few reported cases have considered mental or emotional strain
in deciding a workmen's compensation case, and objectively, the
heart attack does not qualify as an injury.
"'Injury' as used in Workmen's Compensation Act comprehends
a physical or traumatic damage or harm accidental in character and
as a result of external and accidental means in the sense of being the
result of a sudden mishap, occurring by chance, unexpectedly and
not in the usual course of events at a particular time and place."
Dripsv. IndustrialComm'n, 165 Ohio St. 407, 135 N.E.2d 873 1956).
In the principal case no injury of the type defined occurred. In E.
Boggart Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 290 Ill. 530, 125 N.E. 254
(1919), it was stated: "An 'accident' within the Compensation Act is
an injury traceable to a definite time, place, and cause, and occurring
within the course of employment." In the principal case no accident
of the type defined occurred. There was no physical activity of the
type usually connected with accidents.
In Holt v. Acme Mattress Co., 40 Hawaii 660 (1955), a case involving a person with hypertension, where recovery was denied in
the absence of overexertion or direct physical activity preceding a
cerebral attack, it was held that for an injury to be compensable it
must have occurred by accident, arising out of and in the course of
his employment; all three factors must be present or recovery will be
denied. InWest v. North CarolinaDep't of Conservation & Dev.,
229 N.C. 232,49 S.E.2d 398 (1948), the court held that a heart attack
is not an accident within the meaning of the workmen's compensation acts. There is general agreement for the principle stated in In
re Smith, 72 Idaho 8, 286 P.2d 87 (1951), which requires exertion
beyond normal duties of employment leading to a heart attack before
the accident is compensable. The case does not mention mental and
emotional attitude toward one's job as a factor to be considered in
determining whether the accident is compensable.
In Wiltcher v. National Transp. Co. 130 N.Y.S.2d 586, 124 N.E.2d 317 (App. Div. 1954), recovery was allowed where excitement
and emotional strain led to a heart condition. However, the injury
in that case was directly connected with physical activity of a nature
not usually found in the claimant's ordinary work, hence, an accident
in the usually accepted definition used in workmen's compensation
cases. In the principal case, there was no physical activity of an unusual nature.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol61/iss1/17

2

P.: Workmen's Compensation--Mental and Emotional Attitude of Employee
CASE COMMENTS

In Ingolls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Howell, 221 Miss. 824, 74 So.
2d 868 (1954), the court held that if an employee's work causes or
in any manner contributes to a heart attack, compensation may be
awarded.
In essence, the decision in this case seems to be a liberal interpretation of a minority view and is out of line with most precedent in
workmen's compensation cases. Sympathy for the deceased claimant may have influenced the decision in this case. Both liberal construction of workmen's compensation statutes and sympathy used to
broaden the law are condemned in workmen's compensation cases.
In Nollett v. Holland Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 538, 4 N.W.2d 554, 556
(1942), it was stated: ".... . the statute cannot be liberalized by judi-

cial interpretation to allow non-compensable claims." In Lutheran
v. Ford Motor Co., 318 Mich. 487, 21 N.W.2d 825, 828 (1946), it was
stated: "The workmen's compensation law is not designed as a complete substitute for life insurance, or sick and accident insurance, for
employees, nor can sympathy be allowed to broaden its express provisions." The Dinsmore case seems to have violated both principles.
West Virginia adheres to a liberal construction of the workmen's
compensation law with certain reservations. In Young v. State CompensationComnr, 121 W. Va. 126, 8 S.E.2d 517 (1939), it was stated
that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be given a liberal
construction, but it may not be extended to permit consideration of a
claim which the statute in effect says shall not be compensated. In
Martinv. State CompensationComnmr, 107 W. Va. 582, 587, 149 S.E.
824 (1929), it was held that the fact that an employee was suffering
from a pre-existing ailment does not dispense with the necessity of
showing that the injury was actually caused by an accident or injury
received in the course of and arising out of his employment. In
Gilbert v. State Compensation Comm'r, 121 W. Va. 10, 1 S.E.2d 167
(1939), it was held a dilation of the heart was a compensable injury
where an unusual strain occurred. No West Virginia case has considered emotional or physical strain in compensation cases or allowed
recovery for a heart attack in the absence of physical activity. West
Virginia, though adhering to a liberal construction of its compensation statute, seems to require an accident in the usual meaning of the
term and direct physical activity before it will allow recovery for
a heart attack or aggravation of a pre-existing injury or condition in
the employees.
The principal case seems to be subject to criticism for two reasons. It has liberally construed a minority view and considered fac-
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tors not usually considered in compensation cases. No one would
advocate denying compensable claims; however, attempts to make
all claims compensable regardless of how remotely connected with
employment should be condemned.

J.J.P.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
CONSTrrTUTONAL LAW-DLGAaTiON OF PowER-ScnooL
TAx oN RECORnATON OF

Bomu

INsTRumEs.-The clerk of the county

court refused to admit petitioners' deed to record, unless petitioners
paid an additional fee which the clerk asserted was due by virtue
of an ordinance adopted by the county board of education. The
state legislature had delegated to the boards of education the power
to impose by ordinance a recording fee for county school fund purposes. The state constitution gave the legislature the power to provide for the support of free schools and for raising funds therefor in
each county, by authority of the people thereof. Petitioners applied
for a writ of mandamus to require the clerk to record the deed.
Held, mandamus granted. An act which delegates to county boards
of education the power to impose taxes upon the recordation of
instruments is unconstitutional under W. VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1, relating to separation of power, and art. 12, § 5, concerning the responsibility of the legislature for the support of free schools. State
ex rel. Winter v. Brown, 103 S.E.2d 892 (W. Va. 1958).
In West Virginia the right of the legislature to delegate taxing
power to school boards must be based upon a state constitutional
provision. A board of education may exercise the taxing power
only under a delegation by the legislature which does not contravene
the constitution. The validity of this delegated taxing power of the
boards of education was expressly made contingent upon a favorable
majority vote of the people of the county. This decision, however,
does not impair the power and authority of county boards of education to levy taxes for the support of free schools. For further discussion and cases see: 47 Am. Jum. Schools § 78 (1948); 51 Am. Jir.
Taxation § 144 (1944); 11 Am. Jtmr. Constitutional Law § 223
(1937); Amot, 113 A.L.R. 1416 (1988). See also, Warden v. County
Court, 116 W. Va. 695, 183 S.E. 89 (1935).
A. G. H.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol61/iss1/17

4

